Europe’s political centre is almost out of time

Only a few months ago, it looked as if the tide might be turning. When Viktor Orbán was toppled in Hungary in April, many – including this columnist – concluded that European voters had finally seen through the deal that ethno-nationalist populists were offering … cultural grievance with immigration concealing industrial-scale cronyism behind.

Conservatism on immigration and social policy would endure and had shifted to the centre, but the radicalisation, Euro-scepticism and hate speech of the far right had peaked.

Germany has just delivered a sharp rebuke to this narrative. In Mecklenberg-Western Pomerania on Sunday, Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s Christian Democrats (CDU) took a drubbing, obtaining a mere 4.9% of the vote, according to preliminary polling results – short of the 5% threshold required to enter the state parliament.

The far right Alternative for Germany won with 38%, narrowly ahead of the Social Democrats on 35.5%. In Berlin, the CDU lost to The Left party. Furthermore, these grim results for the centre-right came only a fortnight after the AfD beat the CDU in Saxony-Anhalt, a result which raises the possibility that the extreme right will be able to form a government in that state, and that Germany will have its first far-right state government since Hitler.

‘A disaster’

Merz did not sugarcoat things. He immediately called the results a disaster on election night, breaking with the convention that chancellors wait until the following day to comment, and summoned senior party leaders to CDU headquarters to test their loyalty. Eight CDU state premiers had already declared their allegiance to Merz after Saxony-Anhalt. Few in Germany, however, believe that settles the matter.

Sixteen months into his term as Chancellor, Merz is by most measures the least popular chancellor of the postwar era and talk of replacing him has moved from gossiping in Berlin bars into the open.

Yet the pattern matters more than mere personalities. A far-right victory in two states and a far-left one in another is part of a broader trend of German and European politics since the financial crisis: a general splintering and fragmentation of the centre.

Death-spiral of the centre?

Years of economic stagnation helped fracture the political establishment; now this fracturing will make the stagnation harder to escape. Fragmented electorates produce weaker, less cohesive governments, and weaker governments are less likely to push through the tough economic reforms which might restore growth. Is this the death spiral of the post-war European political centre?

Merz’ case for survival rests on precisely those reforms. His coalition is due to adopt changes to pensions, unemployment benefits and labour rules in the coming months; a moderately ambitious package that he hopes will lift business confidence and, eventually, growth. Removing the chancellor now would risk destabilising the coalition and derailing this programme before it has had the time to take effect and resuscitate growth. But whether this is enough to rescue his political career is another question entirely.

A clue from Hungary

This is the dilemma facing not only the CDU but the European political centre more broadly; what, and who, can hold back the far right? Hungary could offer a clue.

Péter Magyar is a former Fidesz insider who had seen the rot in Orbán’s system at close quarters. He campaigned on a socially conservative platform, paired with economic pragmatism and a constructive line on Europe and Ukraine. That combination cunningly took the populist right’s strongest issues off the table while exposing its weakest.

But Magyar also brought something all too missing from the European political establishment; he is telegenic, personable and persuasive. Merz, by contrast, is aloof, wooden and clumsy, and has at some point alienated most of his constituencies with ill-judged remarks about the national work ethic or migrants.

It would be comforting to conclude, therefore, that a change of face would fix things, in the way that the more affable Andy Burnham has lifted Labour’s fortunes after years of maladroit Starmerism. But this is probably unrealistic.

Germany’s toxic mix

Any successor would inherit the same toxic mix of economic and demographic constraints and might be tempted to dilute the pension reforms just when Germany needs to hold its nerve.

For all his clumsiness, Merz is at least realistic about the scale of the problem. The three pillars of Germany’s postwar economic model – cheap Russian gas, Chinese demand for its industrial goods and the US as a dependable security guarantor – have all evaporated.

The carmakers have lost their competitive edge to Chinese EV makers, the welfare state has become an unaffordable luxury and high employment costs are deterring businesses from hiring.

It is an unenviable starting point, and much of it is the inheritance of the Angela Merkel years, when infrastructure was allowed to decay and the country abandoned nuclear power. It was Merkel who took the CDU towards the liberal centre. Is it any wonder that voters are now so distrustful of the CDU, and see a party with neo-Nazi affiliations as being a more representative home for their policy choices?

Race against time

Germany, and Europe more generally, is in a race against time. Can reforms generate enough growth in a post-industrial economy battered by energy shocks and Chinese competition for the centre to regain its momentum? Or will the social unease bred by economic stagnation – and now laser-focused on the social changes brought by the migration surge of the 2010s, to which it attributes all ills – carry enough voters for the far right to govern?

The answer matters well beyond Europe. Most of the world’s major powers are now led by strongmen who openly practise Big Man politics; Donald Trump is only nominally constrained by democratic norms. Europe, alongside like-minded middle powers such as Canada, is among the last defenders of a liberal, rules-based order. Any country invested in multilateralism and rule of law should be concerned.

That includes South Africa, which has long cast itself as an exemplary middle power committed to upholding international law. If Europe’s centre gives way, the order it underwrites goes with it. Countries such as ours would be left to fend for themselves, courted by whoever bids highest or threatens most. The rules-based order was never perfect. But we will miss it when it’s gone. DM