The territorial imperative

President Javier Milei has regained control of the agenda with his Malvinas initiative in what has been widely perceived as yet another example of seeking a foreign distraction from domestic problems. As it happens, the 1982 war lifting the archipelago from its previous obscurity began as just such a classic escape mechanism – the April 2 invasion of that year was preceded by a CGT march on March 30 stretching 30 blocks all the way down from Plaza de Mayo. And the origins of that discontent might sound familiar enough today – the austerity policies of then-economy minister Roberto Alemann had reduced monthly inflation to a then-extraordinary two percent (ringing a bell now) but at a cost causing huge angry crowds to converge on Plaza de Mayo, driving military president Leopoldo Galtieri into that lunatic stunt of invading the islands which had equally huge crowds returning to Plaza de Mayo just three days later to hail him as a conquering hero.

Since the return of democracy in 1983, Argentine presidents have constantly sought foreign distractions in rather less dramatic fashion. President Raúl Alfonsín began his outreach to Brazil to create Mercosur in the tricky year of the 1985 Trial of the Juntas and the Austral Plan while his successor Carlos Menem took Argentina into the G20 in 1999 when the wheels were starting to come off convertibility and his bid for a third term was dead in the water (a discredit perhaps beginning with the 1997 murder of news photographer José Luis Cabezas, whose name has just been given to the street of this newspaper’s offices). And, of course, world history is littered with examples of diversionary foreign policy – thus this was the constant modus operandi of the French Emperor Napoleon III culminating in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) while the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) would be another case in point for a czardom heading towards revolution.

A deft game-changer by President Milei (or rather his spin doctor Santiago Caputo, according to most pundits) but also leaving both sides of the political divide potentially wrong-footed. The Peronists were bemused by the spearhead of opening up Argentina to the world walking off with their nationalist clothes (finding no better ways to outdo him than proposing even harsher bans on those doing business with the Falkland Islands Government along with defence spending boosters) – Milei’s newfound chauvinism aims at garnering electoral dividends but is so out of character with the free-market economist going out of his way to lure overseas investors that some explanation is required. His September 3 nationwide broadcast squared that circle with some success – the sovereignty claims dating back almost two centuries have been given a twist beyond the abstract nationalism voiced by the opposition by the extremely recent development of the Anglo-Israeli Sea Lion project tapping Argentine oil, thus seeking to demonstrate that he has not traded in his economic premises to populism. Yet the contradictions are not so easily eluded – Milei is seeking to sell Argentina as a haven of legal security for foreign capital while threatening to punish companies, shareholders and directors participating in a project opposed on nationalistic grounds.

Nevertheless, the argument of economic need rings somewhat false when considering that Vaca Muerta shale is already bringing in some US$20 billion annually, while South Atlantic offshore oil still lies in the future. No need with Vaca Muerta but the vast shale wealth gives clout giving pause to anybody contemplating negotiating contracts with “usurpers,” thus giving sanctions teeth. Milei’s spiel thus does not really change the essence of the Malvinas sovereignty dispute, which can be described very simply as popular versus territorial sovereignty – the British argument of self-determination for the islanders as against Argentine claims based even more on geographic proximity than historic continuity.

Yet territorial sovereignty is a tricky thing. Two of the most controversial conflicts in today’s world – the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Israeli presence in Gaza – could seek justification on territorial grounds. Vladimir Putin could not only point to a Russian-speaking majority in the Donbas but argue that Rus was not born in Moscow or Saint Petersburg but in Kiyiv – was not Samson Agonistes “eyeless in Gaza” an Israelite? Various claims which could plead a similar geographic proximity go begging. The Channel Islands are closer to Normandy than La Plata to Buenos Aires yet France has never made an issue of their forming part of a more distant United Kingdom. In a more far-fetched hypothesis Indonesia could argue that Australia is simply the largest and southernmost of the East Indies islands (apart from Tasmania) but far from making any such claim, accepts East Timor’s independence. Britain could be asked not only to hand over the islands to Argentina but their own island to the Welsh.

Moving closer to the area under dispute, Mapuche land claims in Patagonia have been treated with much respect (perhaps less so by the current government) and yet 1833, the year of the British takeover, predates the final Mapuche displacement of the original Tehuelches in Patagonia by a few years – thus the very first Kelpers would beat them to it. “We are all immigrants,” as British Ambassador David Cairns said when confronted with the argument of “implanted population.”

If both popular and territorial sovereignty arguments have their flaws, both will be equally needed for any final settlement. Britain will never be able to clone both for simple geographic reasons but Argentina can if it works along the lines floated by Milei last year when he spoke of the mainland needing to become the kind of country the islanders would want to join – a stance from which pandering to the nationalist mood arising from the World Cup distances him. But Milei would need to go one better not only to make Argentina a country the islanders would want to join but also one with whom Britain would want to negotiate.