Iran tensions, Syria talks put Iraqi Kurdistan at the center of Middle Eastern diplomacy - analysis

The Kurdistan Region of northern Iraq has played an increasingly important role, often behind the scenes, in reducing tensions in the region. At a conference of the 2026 Middle East Research Institute (MERI) Forum in Erbil, a number of Kurdish leaders described recent initiatives the region has undertaken.

The new comments at the MERI conference illustrate how the Kurdish leadership sought to navigate the recent conflict between the US, Israel, and Iran. Although the Kurdistan Region came under more than 1,000 Iranian missile and drone attacks, the Kurdish leaders sought to reach out to Iran and the US. They also worked to broker talks between Damascus and Kurds in eastern Syria.

Who were the key leaders involved? Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani and Prime Minister Masrour Barzani played a major role. The two men are related and lead the Kurdistan Democratic Party. In addition, the members of the Talibani family, primarily Bafel and Qubad Talibani, from the rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) party were instrumental.

'We are part of the solution'

“We are very pleased today to see that Kurds are part of the solution - whether in Syria, as marked by the presence of Comrade Mazloum [Abdi] here, or in Iraq, where we are part of the solution,” Qubad Talabani stated at the 2026 Middle East Research Institute (MERI) Forum in Erbil. 

Qubad Talibani is Deputy Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Rudaw reported that Talibani told MERI, “Erbil expressed readiness to facilitate discussions between Kurds and the countries where they live in the Middle East, including in Iran.”

He also said, “We are very pleased today to see that Kurds are part of the solution - whether in Syria, as marked by the presence of Comrade Mazloum [Abdi] here, or in Iraq, where we are part of the solution.”

The report at Rudaw noted that Nechirvan Barzani played a key role in talks in Syria and Turkey. Nechirvan is a unique figure in Kurdish politics today because of his long experience and his ability to navigate the complex politics of Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq.

The Kurdistan Region is involved in a variety of discussions in part because of its geographic position. Northern Iraq borders Iran, Turkey, and Syria. It sits at the crossroads of major regional policies. 

For instance, US forces were concentrated in the KRG before the left on September 30. Iran, as noted, has targeted the region 1,000 times. This is mostly because Iran is targeting Kurdish Iranian opposition groups that are based in northern Iraq. Turkey is dealing with peace talks with the PKK, and the PKK has forces also in the KRG.

Most importantly, the KRG helped smooth discussions in Syria. The US was leaving Syria in 2025, and the US-backed SDF, which is Kurdish-led, was expected to integrate with the new government in Damascus. The Kurdistan Regional Government sought to make sure Kurds would not be harmed in Syria.

“As political forces in the Kurdistan Region, we stand ready for any coordination and role assigned to us,” Qubad Talibani added. “Furthermore, the Kurdistan Region has significantly contributed to the advancement of the integration process of the now-dissolved Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian state system,” Rudaw noted.

SDF commander Mazloum Abdi praised the Kurdistan Region for its support. This is important because there are still many tensions in Syria and the role of the KRG is likely not over. The Syrian Kurdish political authorities, called the AANES, never built a prosperous region like the KRG. They were also linked to the YPG and the PKK, and as such were generally rivals of the KDP. This is internal Kurdish politics, but it matters. When the chips were down, the Kurdish leadership in Erbil went to help Kurds in Syria, despite past disagreements among the politicians.

Not everything has been smooth sailing. Nechirvan Barzani was critical of the Kurdish Iranian opposition groups. These groups have bases and camps in the KRG. Some of the Kurdish Iranian groups are closer to the KDP or PUK.

However, Iran has made it clear it will continue its attacks until the KRG is able to assure Tehran that these groups are not a threat. Earlier in the year, in March, media reports suggested the US was willing to arm the Kurdish Iranian groups. The idea of US arms moving through northern Iraq to Iran was certainly seen by Iran as a threat.

“Rojhelat’s [western Iran’s Kurdish region] opposition forces, unfortunately, behaved very irresponsibly,” Nechirvan Barzani said speaking at MERI. This was tough criticism for these groups.

Barzani’s comments shed light on the issues facing the Kurdish Iranian groups

The Amargi, a local grassroots media network, noted that Barzani’s comments shed light on the complexities the Kurdish Iranian groups have faced. At least six of these groups exist. These include the centrist KDPI and PAK, as well as the more left-leaning Komala and PJAK.

PJAK is often believed to be closely linked to the PKK. Another group, Khabat, is part of the Kurdish Iranian opposition alliance. The groups formed an alliance in January and February, right before the US and Israeli strikes began. Iran may have seen this development as alarming.

“Meanwhile, the parties had begun preparing. According to accounts circulating within their ranks, former peshmerga fighters returned from abroad, while light weapons and vehicles were acquired. These preparations do not substantiate Trump’s allegations that Kurds diverted or kept weapons intended for Iranian protesters. The parties concerned rejected those accusations, which have not been publicly substantiated,” the Amargi noted.

“For some Iranian Kurds, including activists, party supporters and observers, the 39-day war appeared to offer a long-awaited opportunity after what they considered a missed chance during the Jin, Jiyan, Azadi (Women, Life Freedom) movement. They hoped that a weakened regime would pave the way for a ground operation, but events did not unfold as they had expected.”

The Amargi added that “Iranian Kurdish parties explained their decision not to intervene by pointing to the absence of international guarantees and protection. Without air cover, external coordination and a broader uprising in Iran, they feared that an operation would fail and leave civilians exposed to retaliation.”

Barzani’s critique of the groups may not be everything it seems on the surface. He may be trying to reduce tensions with Iran by showing that the KRG is listening to Iran’s concerns. So long as Iran believes that the KRG will rein in these groups, or at least prod them not to send forces over the border, then Iran may reduce its attacks. A recent statement from KDPI, one of the Kurdish Iranian groups, also indicated that KDPI will not send its forces over the border. KDPI tends to be politically close to the KDP, and it will not want to cause the KRG any trouble. KDPI members have resided in the KRG for decades and their facilities near Koya have been frequently targeted by Iran.

Iran knows it can’t eliminate all the Kurdish opposition. It likely prefers the groups weakened and abroad, rather than fighting in Iran. For this reason, Iran is willing to wait and see if the KRG can make sure the groups’ activity is curtailed. Barzani’s comments were aimed at reducing tensions with Tehran in this respect.