Can Japan become a player in the Arctic?

When a South Korean container ship voyaged through the Arctic’s Northern Sea Route earlier this month, it highlighted the potential of the maritime corridor linking Europe and Asia. The U.S. relaxation of hard-line positions against Russia and claims over Greenland have further highlighted shifting perspectives on the value of the Arctic.

For Japan, this raises the question of whether the government is prepared to meet the risks and opportunities in a region shaped by strategic competition and the erosion of international rules.

Tokyo has long recognized its stake in outcomes related to the Arctic, which has only been amplified as receding sea ice creates new possibilities for maritime transport and resource development.

But the regional geopolitical landscape is changing, too, complicating strategy-building and policy decisions. The administration of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi will have to weigh the prospect of diversifying shipping routes against the risks of relying on Russian-controlled infrastructure and areas, while navigating competition over resources and upholding its commitment to international rules and norms.

The government is set to address these issues next year in a revision of the country’s 2015 Arctic policy. The question is how the country will balance competing interests in the region and obligations to those international rules and norms in its engagement with its closest Arctic neighbor, Russia.

Ironically, Japan’s Arctic activity long predates the current geopolitical competition. It has conducted research in the region since the 1950s, and, in 1991, Japan became the first non-Arctic state to establish an observation station in the Arctic. Then, in 2013, the country gained observer status in the Arctic Council — the eight-member body created in 1996 for data sharing and management of regional issues. Japan’s approach has emphasized scientific cooperation, environmental research and economic opportunities, including the development of Arctic shipping routes.

Japan has also sought to expand its research capabilities. The government is preparing to introduce the Mirai II, a new research vessel equipped with icebreaker capabilities that will allow it to operate in waters inaccessible to older Japanese vessels. The ship is expected to support more extensive observations of the Arctic Ocean up to the North Pole, including the region’s atmosphere, sea ice and sea floor.

These efforts demonstrate Tokyo’s intention to remain an active stakeholder in Arctic affairs. But as competition over the region ramps up, scientific research and commercial endeavors are increasingly difficult to separate from broader questions of security and diplomacy.

Japan’s Ambassador for Arctic Affairs Katsuhiko Takahashi alluded to these challenges when he attended the 13th Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavik. While he highlighted Japan’s plans for the new research vessel and intent to update the country’s Arctic policy, Takahashi also stressed the importance of the rule of law and international cooperation in the Arctic.

With the upcoming policy revision, Tokyo has an opportunity to clarify its approach toward a region where economic interests and geopolitical risks are becoming closely intertwined.

Japan will have to balance three things.

The first is its relationship with Russia, especially given the ongoing war in Ukraine. Earlier this year in parliament, senior transport ministry official Masatoshi Miyake explained that while Japanese shipping companies have been involved in transporting natural gas from Russia’s Yamal Peninsula since 2018, the Northern Sea Route is “currently subject to certain restrictions due to the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.”

There is also the issue of recent diplomatic friction between Tokyo and Moscow. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to the Northern Territories – the island groups that the Soviet Union seized following Japan’s surrender – drew sharp rebuke from Japan. More recently, Russia arrested a Hokkaido Shimbun journalist in Sakhalin on charges of espionage.

Given Russia’s geographic position and influence over Arctic shipping, the Takaichi administration would have to consider how cooperation in the Arctic might affect Japan’s broader policy towards Russia. Deeper engagement with Russian-controlled infrastructure and projects will be at odds with Tokyo’s efforts to respond to Russia’s illicit activities.

The policy review will need to clarify what forms of engagement with Russia remain acceptable, what constraints Japan should maintain, and how the government can protect its interests without undermining its broader diplomatic objectives.

The second is Japan’s interests in alternative maritime routes outside of the Middle East.

Japan depends heavily on maritime trade, much of which passes through strategically sensitive waterways. The ongoing conflicts between the U.S., Israel and Iran, as well as Saudi Arabia and Houthi-backed Yemeni forces, have underscored the risks of relying on established shipping corridors.

The Northern Sea Route could eventually offer a way to diversify Japan’s shipping options. But shorter distances do not necessarily translate into lower costs or greater reliability. Russia exercises strict control over portions of the Northern Sea Route, and Moscow requires a permit application and payment for icebreaker escorts that amount to roughly ¥35 million ($220,000) per vessel.

As a result, the route may remain a longer-term option rather than an immediate substitute for established trade corridors. Still, the strategic value of having more options may grow as geopolitical competition and regional conflicts erode the reliability of existing routes. Tokyo will need to determine how much weight to give that potential when setting its Arctic policy priorities.

The third issue is Japan’s role in reinforcing the rules-based international order.

As a non-Arctic state, Japan has limited ability to shape the region through territorial claims. Its influence instead depends on international law, multilateral institutions and scientific cooperation that allow countries beyond the Arctic to contribute to regional governance.

That makes the future of Arctic governance a strategic concern for Tokyo. If competition among major powers displaces multilateral cooperation, Japan could find its ability to affect regional outcomes diminished. It also risks new, unhelpful precedents that contribute to a regional order in which access to shipping routes and resource development is increasingly shaped by the preferences of the most powerful states, rather than international laws, rules, and norms.

These overlapping issues raise a further question: Will the Japanese government need to reform the organization responsible for developing Japan’s Arctic policy?

The Headquarters for Ocean Policy –- an interagency body within the Cabinet Office chaired by the prime minister –- coordinates Japan’s ocean policy, but an Arctic policy that encompasses diplomacy, defense, shipping, energy security, scientific research and economic competition may require greater resourcing and authority. Whether the existing framework is adequate will depend on the scope of the revised policy and the budget the government commits to implementing it.

The forthcoming policy revision offers Tokyo an opportunity to define what it wants to achieve in the Arctic and how it intends to pursue those goals in practice. Japan’s long-standing commitment to scientific cooperation and international rules offers a foundation, but it does not resolve the additional issues related to commercial interests, relations with Russia and the desire to shape regional governance. The challenge for Tokyo will be to turn those competing priorities into a coherent and sustainable Arctic policy.