NZ’s new emergency management law sets the rules. Trust and connection are key to it working

Following a series of major disasters and inquiries that questioned New Zealand’s capacity to deal with them, the new Emergency Management Act 2026 is the most significant improvement in more than two decades.

But legislation only tells part of the story.

Our research into how organisations across New Zealand’s emergency management system interact suggests effective coordination also depends on something less visible – the relationships between people and organisations expected to work together.

Emergency management relies on national, regional and local structures, designated agencies, plans and defined responsibilities which provide necessary authority and accountability. But disasters rarely remain within these boundaries.

The 2023 Auckland Anniversary floods and Cyclone Gabrielle crossed geographic, organisational and infrastructure boundaries. They required numerous organisations to coordinate under uncertain conditions and with incomplete information.

These relationships cannot simply be created when an emergency begins.

Disasters don’t follow organisational charts

Some organisations are formally part of emergency management arrangements. Others become involved because the consequences of a disaster require their expertise, resources or connections.

This means the emergency management system that exists on paper is not necessarily the same as the network that actually responds to a disaster.

For our research, we interviewed 40 participants representing different organisations, sectors and responsibilities. We also used network analysis to examine how participants and organisations are connected. This revealed the importance of relationships, boundaries and key connecting actors.

Our central finding is that relationships matter. Participants identified trust, established relationships, shared learning, regular engagement and understanding other organisations as important conditions for effective collaboration.

Network analysis identified highly connected actors and “brokers” linking groups that might otherwise have limited interaction. These actors can move information across organisational boundaries, helping the wider system adapt when events develop in ways that plans did not anticipate.

But this adaptability can also create vulnerability.

Hidden vulnerability in relying on relationships

When coordination becomes dependent on particular people, relationships can become potential points of fragility. What happens when that person changes role, leaves an organisation or is unavailable during an emergency?

Organisations at the edges of professional networks may similarly struggle to access information or influence decisions, even if they hold local knowledge needed during a disaster.

The barriers our research identified include organisational silos, fragmented information, inconsistent engagement, unclear roles and uneven levels of preparedness.

Creating another committee, rewriting a plan or clarifying a statutory responsibility may be useful. But none automatically produces trust between organisations or creates the relationships required to work effectively under pressure.

Disasters require adaptation

Complex disasters inevitably produce circumstances that cannot be fully predicted. Infrastructure failures can cascade, communities may self-organise, new organisations become involved, and decisions in one part of the system can generate consequences elsewhere.

Research into complex adaptive systems provides a way of understanding how organisations can direct attention towards interactions, feedback and adaptation, rather than operating independently.

From this perspective, some of the most important emergency management capability exists between organisations, rather than within them.

The implementation of the new emergency management act therefore provides an opportunity to consider these relational conditions alongside the formal architecture of the system.

The legislation clarifies roles and responsibilities while retaining an important principle: risks should be managed by those best placed to manage them, at the lowest appropriate level. It also recognises coordination across the wide range of agencies and organisations involved in emergency management.

How the new system is stewarded may therefore be as important as the legislation itself. If stewardship focuses primarily on compliance, structures and standards, it risks overlooking the relational conditions through which coordination occurs.

System stewardship should also strengthen networks, information exchange, shared capability and learning, while ensuring organisations at the edges of the system can participate meaningfully.

None of this suggests formal structures should be abandoned. Legislation, plans, standards and clearly defined responsibilities provide the foundation for emergency management. But they need to be complemented by relationships and adaptive capacity.

The effectiveness of the new act will ultimately be tested during events that cannot be completely anticipated. When that happens, the question will not only be whether organisations understood their statutory responsibilities, but whether they were capable of working together when it mattered.