Race for BARMM’s top post could turn into Marcos-Duterte proxy war

Sam Calleja/Rappler

The scramble for 41 votes in the BARMM parliament tests whether the Macacua and Murad groups can reconcile or whether the struggle could eventually become a potential arena for a Marcos-Duterte showdown

AT A GLANCE

• The race for the Bangsamoro region’s first chief minister hangs in the balance, with no single party able to govern alone.
• The rivalry between the Bangsamoro Federalist Party (BFP) and the United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP) reflects deeper divisions within the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), with former leaders now on opposing sides after a leadership change in 2025.
• The outcome of the negotiations for control of the regional government could have significant implications for the 2028 presidential elections in the Philippines, as national political forces may become involved in the local power struggle.

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CAGAYAN DE ORO, Philippines – The election is over, but the real fight for power in the Bangsamoro region may just be beginning.

The contest for the region’s first elected chief minister is likely to unfold over the next few weeks as rival political camps try to assemble the 41 votes needed to control the new parliament. And what began as a bitter split within the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) could now become entangled with the much larger political struggle between President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and Vice President Sara Duterte in the context of the 2028 presidential elections.

It could become, in effect, a proxy war played out in the Muslim-majority region between two national political forces, with the shape of the region’s first elected government at stake before the new parliament takes office next month.

The September 14 elections produced a regional parliament in which neither of the two dominant parties can govern alone. The five-month-old Bangsamoro Federalist Party (BFP), led by Bangsamoro interim Chief Minister Abdulraof “Sammy Gambar” Macacua, won 16 of the 40 regional party seats. The MILF’s United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP), led by MILF chairman and former BARMM interim chief minister Ahod “Al Haj Murad” Ebrahim, won 15.

The BARMM Grand Coalition (BGC), the party established by the region’s long-entrenched political families, ranked third. But the numbers have transformed the BGC and other smaller regional parties from supporting players into potential kingmakers.

Together, the BFP and UBJP have 61 (party and parliamentary districts) of the 80 seats; the remainder would be filled by the other parties and sectoral representatives. If the BFP and UBJP put aside their differences (which doesn’t seem likely at the moment) and form a coalition, then the “boxing bout is over” this early.

In that scenario, the MILF could emerge as the biggest beneficiary of an election that appeared to pit one faction against another. Both parties are led by former MILF figures who fought in the struggle that led to the creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). Macacua and Murad may now lead rival camps, but at their core, both are products of the MILF’s decades-old struggle.

Therefore, a reconciliation would mean that, beneath the rivalry and political realignment, the movement that fought for the Bangsamoro could retain decisive influence over its first elected government. If that happens, then the MILF, in the end, is the big winner.

Macacua and Murad are rivals because of a rupture within the MILF. In March 2025, Marcos replaced Murad as interim chief minister with Macacua, then the MILF’s armed group chief. The leadership change deepened tensions, and several formerly high-ranking MILF figures subsequently jumped from the UBJP to the BFP.

Macacua eventually left the UBJP, first becoming an independent candidate before taking over as BFP leader a month before the election. The MILF central committee later stripped him and several allies of their positions in the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces.

Now, he and Murad will sit in the same elected parliament. They can carry on their feud. Or they can find a way to govern together.

But if they do not, the BGC’s and other group’s seats could become decisive.

There are already signs that BGC may be leaning toward Macacua. But that is not a settled outcome. Knowing how Philippine politics work, a move toward UBJP cannot be ruled out. If BGC joins Murad’s camp, the UBJP would have a potential route to the majority with support from other lawmakers.

BARMM has just entered the period of gapangan, the mad scramble for political support.

The election has supplied the numbers. Now comes the bargaining, and that could acquire a national dimension.

Macacua is closely associated with the Marcos administration — it was the President who turned Murad’s former senior minister and MILF armed wing top commander into BARMM interim chief minister. In 2022, Macacua is said to have supported the presidential bid of Marcos, while the MILF leadership openly backed then-vice president Leni Robredo.

Although he lost the top BARMM post to Macacua via presidential appointment, Murad has remained aschairman of the MILF and the leading figure of the UBJP. If the two camps clash over the chief minister’s post, the Marcos and Duterte forces could see the coalition negotiations as another arena in which influence can be gained or lost. Whoever controls the regional government would be in a strategic position to influence the outcome of the 2028 presidential elections in the BARMM.

The Duterte camp, in particular, could have an incentive to work against Macacua in the election because of his ties to Marcos.

That does not mean that every politician who opposes the BFP is a Duterte ally. Bangsamoro politics has its own alliances, political families, and local calculations that do not always follow the divisions in Manila — or Davao.

But if BFP and UBJP remain locked in their fight, the national divide could become harder to keep outside the room of the BARMM.

A BFP-UBJP reconciliation could keep the center of gravity within the Bangsamoro, bringing two rival MILF factions into one governing arrangement. But a prolonged fight could do the opposite, pulling BGC and the other smaller blocs deeper into the contest and giving national political forces more reason to take an interest.

In the next few weeks, the question will be who can get at least 41 votes, who is willing to make the necessary bargains and whether the struggle remains a Bangsamoro dispute or becomes an arena for a Marcos-Duterte showdown.

The first elected BARMM government of the Bangsamoro will take office next month. Before then, its government may be decided in the backroom negotiations now beginning. Or, it may have already been decided. – Rappler.com